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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Caroline Eguilior appeals from the district court’s order summarily
dismissing her post-conviction petition.
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings
In January 2015, Eguilior stole a safe containing $1,490.07 from a Twin
Falls Subway restaurant. (PSI, p.5.1) Three days later, Eguilior robbed a second
Twin Falls Subway restaurant, where she was previously employed, at gunpoint.
(PSI, p.4.) During that robbery, Eguilior tied the hands of two Subway employees
with zip ties. (Id.) After taking $315 from the restaurant cash register, Eguilior
fled the scene in an employee’s car. (Id.) The employee recognized Eguilior’s
voice and was able to identify her to police. (Id.)
Eguilior was arrested shortly thereafter. (PSI, pp.4-5.) Officers recovered
a stolen handgun from a bag Eguilior was seen discarding in a dumpster. (PSI,
p.4.) Officers also recovered, from Eguilior’s possession, a Home Depot credit
card belonging to another individual. (PSI, p.5.) A police review of Home Depot
surveillance video revealed that, in January 2015, Eguilior made two purchases
totaling $773.12 with the card. (Id.)
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In the two post-conviction cases which are the subject of this appeal, the district
court took judicial notice of documents associated with the underlying criminal
cases. (R., p.23.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Eguilior’s motion to
augment the appellate record with these documents. (4/24/17 Order.) In this
brief, the state cites to the PSI as “PSI,” and other documents from the
augmentation as “Aug.”
1

In Twin Falls County Case No. CR 2015-00553, the state charged Eguilior
with two counts of burglary, two counts of grand theft, two counts of aggravated
assault, two counts of second-degree kidnapping, two counts of robbery, and one
count of unlawful possession of a firearm; in Twin Falls County Case No.
CR 2015-04279, the state charged Eguilior with two counts of forgery of a
financial transaction card. (See Aug., p.31.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,
Eguilior pled guilty to the two forgery counts, unlawful possession of a firearm,
and one count of robbery. (See Aug., pp.15-31.) The state agreed to dismiss the
remaining charges. (Aug., p.31.) Eguilior agreed to waive her rights to file a
direct appeal or an I.C.R. 35(b) motion.

(Id.)

Consistent with the joint

recommendation of the parties, the district court imposed a unified 20-year
sentence with eight years fixed for robbery, a fixed five-year sentence for
unlawful possession of a firearm, and unified 12-year sentences with eight years
fixed for both forgery charges. (Aug., pp.15-31.) The court ordered all of the
sentences to run concurrently. (Id.)
Eguilior filed two pro se post-conviction petitions.2 (R., pp.4-18, 68-82.) In
each petition, Eguilior sought only a modification of her sentences. (R., pp.6,
70.) Eguilior requested the appointment of counsel in both cases. (R., pp.19-22,
83-86.)

Of the numerous claims raised in these petitions, Eguilior asserted,

relevant to this appeal, that her trial counsel was ineffective for pressuring her

2

In Twin Falls County Case No. CV-2016-01991, Eguilior challenged the
sentences imposed in CR-2015-04279, and in Twin Falls County Case No. CV2016-01992, Eguilior challenged the sentences imposed in CR-2015-00533. (R.,
pp.4-18, 68-82.)
2

into pleading guilty and for preventing her from taking the cases to trial. (R.,
pp.4-18, 68-82.)
The district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss both petitions. (R.,
pp.23-26.) The court concluded that because Eguilior sought only a modification
of her sentences, her post-conviction claims that did not implicate trial counsel’s
performance with respect to these sentences were frivolous. (Id.) The court also
concluded that the allegations that did relate to sentencing were conclusory and
that “there is nothing in this record to establish that there exists other evidence,
which if presented to the court, would have justified a sentence other than the
stipulated sentence.” (R., pp.24-25 (footnote omitted).) The court also denied
Eguilior’s motions for the appointment of counsel, after finding that the claims
were frivolous, and “not ones that would be filed by a person who would retain
counsel.”

(R., p.24.)

Three weeks later, the district court dismissed both

petitions.

(R., pp.27-28.3) Eguilior timely appealed, and the Idaho Supreme

Court consolidated the two cases. (R., pp.43-46, 105-108; 10/7/16 Order.)

3

Eguilior mailed a letter to the district court in response to the notice of intent to
dismiss. (R., pp.95-97.) The letter was dated July 1, 2016, but was not filed in
the Twin Falls County district court until July 11, 2016, five days after the court
summarily dismissed the petitions. (R., pp.93-97.) In the letter, Eguilior did not
attempt to modify the remedy sought in her post-conviction petitions. (See R.,
pp.95-97.) After she filed her Appellant’s brief in this case, Eguilior filed an
I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion for relief from judgment in the district court, requesting that
the court consider her response to its notice of intent to dismiss, and to grant
appropriate relief. (See 6/13/17 Motion to Stay the Appellate Proceedings.)
Eguilior also filed a motion to stay the appellate proceedings in this case pending
the district court’s ruling on the I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion. (Id.) The district court
denied the I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion, and the Idaho Supreme Court thereafter denied
the motion to stay the appellate proceedings as moot. (6/28/17 Order.)
3

ISSUE
Eguilior states the issue on appeal as:
Whether the district court erred by denying Ms. Eguilior’s
motion for appointment of post-conviction counsel.
(Appellant’s brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Eguilior failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its
discretion by denying her motions for appointment of counsel?

4

ARGUMENT
Eguilior Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Abused Its Discretion
By Denying Her Motions For Appointment Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
Eguilior contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying

her motions for the appointment of counsel. (See generally Appellant’s brief.)
Specifically, Eguilior contends she was entitled to appointed counsel on her claim
that her trial counsel was ineffective for pressuring her into pleading guilty and for
preventing her from taking the cases to trial. (Id.) A review of the record reveals
that this claim was frivolous because Eguilior sought only sentencing relief in the
post-conviction petitions. Eguilior thus failed to raise the possibility of a valid
claim, and has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in
denying her motions to appoint counsel.
B.

Standard Of Review
The decision to grant or deny a request for court-appointed counsel to

represent a post-conviction petitioner pursuant to I.C. § 19-4904 is discretionary.
Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111 (2004); Plant v.
State, 143 Idaho 758, 761, 152 P.3d 629, 632 (Ct. App. 2007).
C.

Eguilior Was Not Entitled To The Appointment Of Counsel On Her Claim
That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Pressuring Her Into Pleading Guilty
And For Preventing Her From Taking The Case To Trial
Post-conviction counsel should be appointed if the petitioner qualifies

financially and “alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to
5

conduct a further investigation into the claim.” Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651,
655, 152 P.3d 12, 16 (2007); see also Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho at 793,
102 P.3d at 1112; I.C. § 19-4904. If the claims are so patently frivolous that there
appears no possibility that they could be developed into a viable claim even with
the assistance of counsel, however, the court may deny the motion for counsel
and proceed with the usual procedure for dismissing meritless post-conviction
petitions. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 529, 164 P.3d 798, 809 (2007);
Newman v. State, 140 Idaho 491, 493, 95 P.3d 642, 644 (Ct. App. 2004).
In this case, the district court properly concluded that Eguilior’s claim that
her trial counsel was ineffective for pressuring her into pleading guilty and for
preventing her from taking the cases to trial was frivolous. (R., pp.23-26.) As the
court recognized, even if Eguilior’s factual assertions regarding this claim were
true, she would still not be entitled to her sole requested relief of sentence
modification because there is no causal connection between that claim and the
requested relief. (R., p.25.) The court further noted that in requesting sentencing
relief, Eguilior was essentially attempting to use the post-conviction petition to
obtain I.C.R. 35(b) relief – but that Eguilior had previously waived her right to
seek such relief in her plea agreement with the state and that, in any event, the
time for presenting an I.C.R. 35(b) motion for reduction of sentence had expired.4
(Id.)
On appeal, Eguilior suggests that, if appointed, counsel could have
amended her petition to request different relief – such as withdrawal of her guilty
4

Further, reduction of sentence is not a basis for post-conviction relief. Williams
v. State, 113 Idaho 685, 687, 747 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1987).
6

plea and vacating her conviction.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.9-10.)

However, the

purpose of appointing counsel to represent a post-conviction petitioner who has
alleged facts raising the possibility of a valid claim is to assist the petitioner in
developing those facts – not to direct a petitioner to seek a different type of relief.
See Green v. State, 160 Idaho 657, 658, 377 P.3d 1120, 1121 (Ct. App. 2016)
(“[I]f a petitioner alleges facts that raise the possibility of a valid claim, the district
court should appoint counsel in order to give the petitioner an opportunity to work
with counsel and properly allege the necessary supporting facts.” (citing
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 793, 102 P.3d at 1112)). As the Idaho Supreme Court
further explained in Charboneau:
As stated above, a needy applicant for post-conviction relief
is entitled to court-appointed counsel unless the trial court
determines that the post-conviction proceeding is frivolous. Idaho
Code § [19–8522(2)(c)5] sets forth the standard for determining
whether or not a post-conviction proceeding is frivolous. It is
frivolous if it is “not a proceeding that a reasonable person with
adequate means would be willing to bring at his own expense.”
When applying that standard to pro se applications for appointment
of counsel, the trial court should keep in mind that petitions and
affidavits filed by a pro se petitioner will often be conclusory and
incomplete. Although facts sufficient to state a claim may not be
alleged because they do not exist, they also may not be alleged
because the pro se petitioner simply does not know what are the
essential elements of a claim.
It is essential that the petitioner be given adequate notice of
the claimed defects so he has an opportunity to respond and to
give the trial court an adequate basis for deciding the need for
counsel based upon the merits of the claims. If the court decides
that the claims in the petition are frivolous, the court should provide
sufficient information regarding the basis for its ruling to enable the
5

This statute subsection cited by the Idaho Supreme Court in 2004 in
Charboneau has since been re-codified. Idaho S.L. 2013, ch. 256, § 1, eff. July
1, 2013.
7

petitioner to supplement the request with the necessary additional
facts, if they exist. Although the petitioner is not entitled to have
counsel appointed in order to search the record for possible
nonfrivolous claims, he should be provided with a meaningful
opportunity to supplement the record and to renew his request for
court-appointed counsel prior to the dismissal of his petition where,
as here, he has alleged facts supporting some elements of a valid
claim.
Charboneau, 140 Idaho at 792-793, 102 P.3d at 1111-1112 (quoting Brown v.
State, 135 Idaho 676, 23 P.3d 138 (2001)).
Therefore, while a pro se post-conviction petitioner may be entitled to the
appointment of counsel to assist in the factual development of a claim even
where the claim is conclusory, incomplete, or otherwise lacking in essential
elements, Idaho law does not require appointment of counsel simply to direct or
instruct a petitioner to seek different relief.
In this case, there is rational reason why Eguilior may not have wanted to
withdraw her guilty plea, and instead, only sought a modification of her sentence.
As the district court noted (R., p.25 n.1), Eguilior’s plea agreement with the state
resulted in the dismissal of nine felony charges (Aug., p.31). Eguilior would be in
the position to face those charges anew had she succeeded in obtaining the
relief that she now, on appeal, asserts that appointed counsel could have
amended her petition to seek.
Because no further factual development of her claim that her trial counsel
was ineffective with respect to her guilty plea would have entitled Eguilior to a
modification of her sentence, Eguilior failed to raise the possibility of a valid
claim. Therefore, Eguilior has failed to demonstrate that the district court abused
its discretion in denying her motion for appointment of counsel.
8

On appeal, Eguilior also contends that the district court applied an
incorrect standard to determine whether post-conviction counsel should have
been appointed. (Appellant’s brief, pp.5-6.) Specifically, Eguilior contends that
the district court erred by concluding that the petition was frivolous “based only
on the perceived merits of the allegations made, rather than assessing whether
those allegations could, with the assistance of counsel, be developed into a
viable claim.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5 (citing Swader, 143 Idaho at 653, 152 P.3d at
16).)
In Swader, the Idaho Supreme Court distinguished between postconviction claims that are frivolous as presented to the court, and post-conviction
claims that are frivolous because they do not even raise the possibility of a valid
claim:
When considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the
trial court must do more than determine whether the petition alleges
a valid claim. The court must also consider whether circumstances
prevent the petitioner from making a more thorough investigation
into the facts. An indigent defendant who is incarcerated in the
penitentiary would almost certainly be unable to conduct an
investigation into facts not already contained in the court record.
Likewise, a pro se petitioner may be unable to present sufficient
facts showing that his or her counsel’s performance was deficient or
that such deficiency prejudiced the defense. That showing will
often require the assistance of someone trained in the law.
Therefore, the trial court should appoint counsel if the petition
alleges facts showing the possibility of a valid claim such that a
reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claim.
Swader, 143 Idaho at 654-655, 152 P.3d at 15-16.
For the reasons set forth above, the concerns expressed in Swader are
not applicable in this case, and Eguilior’s contention that the district court applied

9

the wrong standard thus fails. The district court did not conclude that Eguilior’s
ineffective assistance of counsel claims concerning the entry of her plea were
frivolous because they lacked factual development, or because Eguilior was
unable to adequately investigate the case — defects which could have been
theoretically remedied by appointed counsel. Instead, the court concluded that
these claims were frivolous because they lacked a causal connection with
Eguilior’s sole requested relief of sentence modification. Under this reasoning,
no factual development of the claims could have remedied this defect. The court
thus necessarily and appropriately concluded that these claims were so patently
frivolous that there was no possibility that they could be developed into viable
claims even with the assistance of counsel. See Newman, 140 Idaho at 493,
95 P.3d at 644.
Because she sought only modification of her sentence, Eguilior failed to
allege facts raising a possibility of a valid ineffective assistance of counsel claim
with respect to her guilty plea. Therefore, Eguilior has failed to demonstrate that
the district court abused its discretion by denying her motions for appointment of
counsel to represent her on this claim.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court’s
order dismissing Eguilior’s post-conviction petition.
DATED this 29th day of June, 2017.

_/s/ Mark W. Olson_________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of June, 2017, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
BRIAN R. DICKSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

MWO/dd

__/s/ Mark W. Olson_________
MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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